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SCALIA’S INFIDELITY:
A CRITIQUE OF “FAINT-HEARTED” ORIGINALISM
Randy E. Barnett∗

In this essay, based on the 2006 William Howard Taft Lecture, I
critically evaluate Justice Antonin Scalia’s famous and influential
1988 Taft Lecture, entitled Originalism: The Lesser Evil. In his
lecture, Justice Scalia began the now-widely-accepted shift from
basing constitutional interpretation on the intent of the framers to
relying instead on the original public meaning of the text. At the same
time, I explain how Justice Scalia allows himself three ways to escape
originalist results that he finds to be objectionable: (1) when the text
is insufficiently rule-like, (2) when precedent has deviated from
original meaning and (3) when the first two justifications are
unavailing, just ignore originalism to avoid sufficiently objectionable
results. While Justice Scalia describes his approach as “faint-hearted
originalism,” I contend that he is not really an originalist at all as
evidenced by this lecture and also by his stances as a Justice in
several important cases. This leaves Justice Thomas as the only
Justice who seems at all bound by originalist conclusions with which
he may disagree. I then summarize why the courts ought to adhere to
original public meaning originalism, why this form of originalism is
preferable to the principal alternative—which I call the “underlying
principles” approach—and why originalism, properly understood,
does not lead to the types of grossly objectionable results that leads
Justice Scalia to be faint of heart.

I am deeply honored to be invited to give the 2006 William Howard
Taft Lecture. It is an honor to stand here in the footsteps of such
distinguished previous lecturers as Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and
Antonin Scalia, Senators Orrin Hatch and Alan Simpson, Judges Patricia
Wald and Ken Starr, university presidents Benno Schmidt and Lee
Bollinger, and super-luminary law professors Pam Karlan and Akhil
Amar. And it is also an honor to give a lecture dedicated to the memory
of William Howard Taft, whom Justice Scalia aptly described as
∗ Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center.
Permission to photocopy for classroom use is hereby granted. This paper was presented as the 2006
William Howard Taft Lecture at the University of Cincinnati College of Law on February 2, 2006.
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an extraordinary man by any standard. A state trial judge at twenty-nine,
Solicitor General of the United States at thirty-two, a United States
Circuit Judge at thirty-four, Professor and Dean at the University of
Cincinnati Law School, High Commissioner of the Philippines, Secretary
of War, President of the United States, and Chief Justice of the United
States.1

While I am certainly far more sympathetic with Taft’s efforts as Chief
Justice to hold Congress to its enumerated powers than are most law
professors, this will not be the focus of my remarks. At least not
directly.2
JUSTICE SCALIA’S TAFT LECTURE
Instead, I wish to take as my subject Justice Scalia’s 1988 Taft
Lecture, Originalism: The Lesser Evil. The published version of this
lecture in the University of Cincinnati Law Review has had an enormous
influence. It is among the most frequently cited law review articles3
and—together with Justice Scalia’s introduction to A Matter of
Interpretation4—helped shape the current debate over the proper method
of constitutional interpretation. Indeed, his Taft Lecture can be credited
with contributing to one of the most remarkable intellectual comeback
stories of legal scholarship.
In the 1980s various leading figures in constitutional law took aim at
the contention that the Constitution should be interpreted according to
the original intentions of its framers. Originalism, it was widely
thought, was thoroughly trounced by three unanswerable objections:
First, originalism is impractical because it is impossible to discover and
aggregate the various intentions held by numerous framers.5 Second,
originalism is actually contrary to the original intentions of the founding
generation who themselves rejected reliance on original intent.6 Finally,
originalism is to be rejected because it is wrong for the living to be
bound by the dead hand of the past.
1. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
2. Adopting an original meaning method of interpretation would justify holding Congress to its
enumerated powers, as Chief Justice Taft favored.
3. It is cited in 462 law review articles.
4. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (Antonin
Scalia & Amy Gutmann, eds., 1998).
5. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980).
6. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885 (1985).
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In his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia was perhaps the first defender of
originalism to shift the theory from its previous focus on the intentions
of the framers of the Constitution to the original public meaning of the
text at the time of its enactment.7 This shift from original framers intent
to original public meaning obviated much of the practical objection to
originalism.8 That language has an accessible public meaning is what
enables interpersonal communication. If words did not have an
objective meaning beyond the subjective intention of speakers and
writers, we would never be able to understand each other. Indeed, the
objective theory by which private contracts are normally interpreted
assumes the availability of such meaning. And the very same evidence
that shows the founding generation rejecting reliance on the intentions of
the framers also shows their reliance on the original public meaning of
the text.
Shifting from original framers intent to original public meaning did
little to answer the “dead hand” objection, however. Why be bound by
the past? For that, Justice Scalia and other originalists had to develop a
theory of constitutional legitimacy. Most originalists stressed the theory
of popular sovereignty. They contended that the Constitution is an
authoritative expression of the will of the People, which judges are dutybound to follow. While some originalists may have thought this theory
justified adhering to the original intent of the framers, most quickly saw
that the relevant authority to be obeyed were the ratifiers rather than the
framers of the Constitution.
The theory that constitutions obtain their legitimacy from the consent
of the governed is widely held. It is favored by most on the left as well
as on the right, as evidenced from the title of Bruce Ackerman’s books,
We the People,9 as well as the substance of Taft Lecturer Akhil Amar’s
book, The Bill of Rights.10 Also in this camp is the “popular
constitutionalism” of Mark Tushnet’s, Taking the Constitution Away
from the Courts,11 and Larry Kramer’s, The People Themselves.12 In all
7. This is the term he (almost) consistently uses in his Taft Lecture. (For an exception see infra
text accompanying note 35.) He defends this choice in Scalia, supra note 4, at 38 (“What I look for in
the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the
original draftsmen intended.”).
8. This and the next two paragraphs summarize the argument presented in Parts I & II of
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 1–131
(2004).
9. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
10. See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
11. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
12. See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2006).
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of these books, however, the theory of popular sovereignty is simply
assumed rather then defended.
I won’t attempt a detailed refutation of the popular sovereignty theory
of constitutional legitimacy here, something I do provide in Restoring
the Lost Constitution.13 The basic problem is that, while the theory is
founded on the consent of the governed, consent morally binds only
those who themselves actually consent. No one has yet explained how
the consent of some of our ancient ancestors, and in my case someone
else’s ancestors—or for that matter the consent of only some today—can
bind those alive today who have not consented. The attempt to show
how some can consent for others is the constitutional theory equivalent
of squaring the circle, or perhaps a perpetual motion machine would be
an even more apt analogy. No matter how well it outwardly seems to
run, the insides of any such theory inevitably involve some form of
cheat.
In his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia did not emphasize the theory of
popular sovereignty but offered a theory of legitimacy grounded in the
role of the judiciary. Here is how he put the point:
The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my view, is its
incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of
constitutionality. . . . [T]he Constitution, though it has an effect superior
to other laws, is in its nature the sort of “law” that is the business of the
courts—an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the
usual devices familiar to those learned in the law. If the Constitution
were not that sort of a “law,” but a novel invitation to apply current
societal values, what reason would there be to believe that the invitation
was addressed to the courts rather than to the legislature? One simply
cannot say, regarding that sort of novel enactment, that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department” to
determine its content. Quite to the contrary, the legislature would seem a
much more appropriate expositor of social values, and its determination
that a statute is compatible with the Constitution should, as in England,
prevail.14

According to this argument, originalism is based on the proper role of
courts as “law followers” so the Constitution, as law, must be something
that can be followed as opposed to invented or made up. The latter role
we normally associate with the legislature. And the only way the
Constitution provides “law” to be followed is if it is viewed as an
authoritative command with a discernable public meaning at the time of
its enactment.
13. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 11–31.
14. Scalia, supra note 1, at 854.
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While I think the idea of viewing the Constitution as “law” is
promising—and I will offer my own take on this later—there are two
problems with Justice Scalia’s account. First, it begs the question of the
Constitution’s legitimacy, focusing instead on the legitimacy of judicial
review within our (assumedly legitimate) constitutional system. Even
where the text of the Constitution contains clear law-like commands, the
dead hand argument questions whether we the living are to be bound by
the commands of the dead, however clear they may be. Scalia’s account
offers no rejoinder, but I cannot fault him too much for this. After all,
very few constitutional scholars have presented an explicit theory of
what makes a constitution binding on the living.15 Most prefer to
silently assume it is, articulating something like a consent of the
governed approach based on some notion of assent by today’s popular
majority when forced to confront the issue.16
Still, I cannot critique a theory that Justice Scalia did not articulate, so
I proceed to another difficulty with his normative defense of originalism:
Justice Scalia’s approach would seem to justify judicial enforcement of
only those passages of the Constitution that are sufficiently rule-like to
constitute a determinate command that a judge can simply follow. The
more general or abstract provisions of the Constitution are hardly rules
that fit this description, so should judges ignore them?
It turns out that, with respect to the Ninth Amendment, for example,
this is precisely the view later adopted by Justice Scalia himself. In the
case of Troxel v. Granville,17 he dismissed the unenumerated rights
“retained by the people” to which the Ninth Amendment expressly refers
as subject only to the protection of majorities in legislative bodies.18 But
this puts him in an awkward position. According to his argument,
judges must decide for themselves which clauses meet his standard of a
rule of law and which do not, because only the former merit judicial
protection. By this route, large portions of the Constitution become
nonjusticiable by judicial fiat. For example, all unenumerated rights
become judicially unenforceable, which certainly results in their being
“disparaged” or “denied”—exactly how the Ninth Amendment says the
Constitution is not to be construed. Also banished from the courts
would be much of the Fourteenth Amendment, and who knows what
other more abstract provisions.

15. For an exception, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 1787 (2005).
16. See supra text accompanying notes 9–12.
17. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
18. Id. at 91–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

G-BARNETT

12

11/29/2006 5:00:51 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

No doubt, Justice Scalia would condemn those many constitutional
law professors who would urge courts to ignore the original meaning of
the Constitution where doing so conflicts with their conception of
“justice.” But Justice Scalia himself commits the comparable sin of
ignoring the original meaning of those portions of the Constitution that
conflict with his conception of “the rule of law as a law of rules.”19
Discarding those provisions that do not meet with one’s approval hardly
seems like what we would call “fidelity” to a written constitution.
Justice Scalia’s infidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution
as a whole manifests itself in another way in his Taft Lecture. To the
objection that originalism “[i]n its undiluted form, at least, . . . is
medicine that seems too strong to swallow,”20 he offers two responses.
First, he asserts a strong role for precedent, even where it is inconsistent
with the original meaning of the text: “Thus, almost every originalist
would adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis,” he admitted, “so
that Marbury v. Madison would stand even if Professor Raoul Berger
should demonstrate unassailably that it got the meaning of the
Constitution wrong.”21 Notice that, contrary to his professed skepticism
about the legitimacy of judicial review, this stance puts prior opinions of
mere judges above that of the Constitution. Why? Simply because the
results of doing otherwise seem to him too objectionable to countenance.
Even adherence to stare decisis, however, is inadequate to escape the
objectionable results that Justice Scalia thinks stems from a fearless
adherence to original meaning.
But stare decisis alone is not enough to prevent originalism from being
what many would consider too bitter a pill. What if some state should
enact a new law providing public lashing, or branding of the right hand,
as punishment for certain criminal offenses? Even if it could be
demonstrated unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual
measures in 1791, and even though no prior Supreme Court decision has
specifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any federal judge—even
among the many who consider themselves originalists—would sustain
them against an eighth amendment challenge.22

So what does Justice Scalia say an originalist judge should do in the
face of such objectionable results? Punt. In perhaps the most famous
passage of his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia describes himself as a “fainthearted originalist.” In his words, “I hasten to confess that in a crunch I
19.
(1989).
20.
21.
22.

See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175–81
Scalia, supra note 1, at 861.
Id.
Id.
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may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any
more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the
punishment of flogging.”23 Indeed, he thinks, it is
the fact that most originalists are faint-hearted and most nonoriginalists
are moderate (that is, would not ascribe evolving content to such clear
provisions as the requirement that the President be no less than thirty-five
years of age) which accounts for the fact that the sharp divergence
between the two philosophies does not produce an equivalently sharp
divergence in judicial opinions.24

IS JUSTICE SCALIA AN ORIGINALIST?
On his account of the proper approach to interpreting the
Constitution, then, Justice Scalia proves unfaithful to the original
meaning of the text in three distinct ways. First, he is willing to ignore
the original meaning of those portions of the Constitution that do not
meet his criteria of the rule of law as the law of rules. Second, he is
willing to avoid objectionable outcomes that would result from
originalism by invoking the precedents established by the dead hand of
nonoriginalist justices. Third, where precedent is unavailing as an
escape route, he is willing simply to abandon originalist results that he
and most others would find too onerous by some unstated criteria.
Does Justice Scalia’s faint-hearted fidelity to the original meaning of
the Constitution not represent something of a refutation of originalism
itself. Others have surely drawn this lesson both from Justice Scalia’s
Taft Lecture and from the way he practices originalism as a Justice.
And why shouldn’t they? After all, if so lion-hearted a jurist as he
shrinks in practice from the implications of a theory he so vociferously
defends, is this not pretty strong evidence that originalism itself ought to
be rejected as unworkable and ultimately unwise?
I think not. Instead, I would conclude from his Taft Lecture and his
behavior on the Court that Justice Scalia is simply not an originalist.
Whatever virtues he attributes to originalism, he leaves himself not one
but three different routes by which to escape adhering to the original
meaning of the text. These are more than enough to allow him, or any
judge, to reach any result he wishes. Where originalism gives him the
results he wants, he can embrace originalism. Where it does not, he can
embrace precedent that will. Where friendly precedent is unavailing, he
can assert the nonjusticiability of clauses that yield results to which he is
23. Id. at 864.
24. Id. at 862.
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opposed. And where all else fails, he can simply punt, perhaps citing the
history of traditionally-accepted practices of which he approves.
For those who may still doubt Justice Scalia’s lack of fidelity to
originalism, I cite three examples. The first is his stance in the famous
case of United States v. Lopez25 in which the Court held the Gun Free
School Zones Act unconstitutional because it exceeded the powers of
Congress under the Commerce Clause. In this case, although Chief
Justice Rehnquist based his opinion for the Court on “first principles,”26
he also expended considerable effort to reconcile the result in Lopez
with the Court’s post-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In
contrast, Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion urging the Court
to reconsider its post-New Deal interpretation of the Commerce Clause
in light of its original meaning.27
I think it is telling that, in Lopez, Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion of the Court but did not join the originalist
concurring opinion of Justice Thomas. This refusal is all the more
remarkable because Justice Scalia obviously agreed with the outcome of
an originalist analysis in the case at hand. We can only guess at why
Justice Scalia avoided noting his agreement with Justice Thomas’s
originalist analysis. Future events I shall describe in a moment,
however, suggest that he may well have foreseen the day when he would
not approve of the results of an originalist analysis, so he declined to
endorse them when he did. And one virtue of originalism is that such
results are often not hard to predict.
My second example of Justice Scalia’s infidelity to originalism is
very much like the first. In Kelo v. New London,28 in which the Court
upheld the use of eminent domain to take private property for the use of
a private developer, Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent.29
Once again he chose not to join the explicitly originalist dissenting
opinion of Justice Thomas.30 This choice is another example of Justice
Scalia’s refusal to endorse an originalist justification of a result with
which he agrees.
My final example is quite different. In the medical cannabis case of
Gonzales v. Raich31, which I argued in the Supreme Court two terms
25. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
26. Id. at 552 (“The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”).
27. See id. at 584–602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
28. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
29. See id. at 2671–2677 (joining O’Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2229–2239 (Thomas, J. dissenting). I am not here asserting that Justice Thomas’s
originalist analysis of the Takings Clause in Kelo is correct, but that it was incumbent on a truly
originalist Justice either to agree or to explain the originalist basis for his disagreement.
31. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
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ago, Justice Scalia joined the majority of the Court in upholding the
application of the Controlled Substances Act to persons who grow
cannabis on their own property solely for their own medical use as
recommended by their physicians and authorized by state law.32 Unlike
Lopez and Kelo, in Raich Justice Scalia was on the opposite side of the
case from Justice Thomas, who filed an impassioned originalist dissent.
Unlike the previous cases where he silently joined the nonoriginalist
opinions of others without telling us why he rejected Justice Thomas’s
originalist analysis, this time he filed his own concurring opinion in
which he stressed his reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause.33
While there is much I could say about the position he articulates in
Raich, most pertinent for present purposes was Justice Scalia’s complete
refusal to confront and refute Justice Thomas’s originalist analysis,
something it would seem incumbent on a justice truly committed to
originalism to do.
I think these three examples reveal that, if any current justice can
fairly be described as a committed originalist, it is Justice Thomas and
not Justice Scalia. But this would surprise no one who read Justice
Scalia’s Taft Lecture. Any judge who leaves himself not one, but three
different avenues by which to abandon original meaning can hardly be
viewed as committed to the methodology. And indeed, his judicial
stances reveal that he is not, as does his distancing himself from Justice
Thomas’s willingness to reconsider precedents that are inconsistent with
original meaning.34
At this point, I could speculate about what Justice Scalia is committed
to, if not to originalism. My guess is that it is some mixture of
democratic majoritarianism, judicial restraint, and acceptable policy
outcomes, but such a claim would be hard to establish, and I shall not
try. Instead, in the final portion of my remarks, I wish to return to the
challenge to which I earlier alluded: If someone so stout-hearted and
disputatious as Justice Scalia cannot stick with originalism when it
pinches, does this not strongly suggest that the fault lies not with him
but with originalism itself?
Of course, if Justice Scalia, like professed nonoriginalists, is actually
committed to other values or objectives above originalism, he may well
assert the difficulties of originalism as a means of pursuing these other
32. Id. at 2215–2220 (Scalia, J., concurring).
33. Id at 2215–2220 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
34. Justice Scalia has been quoted as saying that Justice Thomas “doesn’t believe in stare
decisis, period. . . . [I]f a constitutional line of authority is wrong, [Thomas] would say, ‘Let’s get it
right.’ I wouldn’t do that.” As quoted by Ken Foskett in Douglas T. Kendall, A Big Question About
Clarence Thomas, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2004, at A31.
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values, as nonoriginalists do. If so, the only thing distinguishing him
from nonoriginalists is his admission that originalism is the most
defensible method of interpretation. Indeed, he notes in his Taft Lecture
the similarity in all but name between his faint-hearted originalism and
moderate nonoriginalism.35
If we take his reservations about a fearless originalism at a face value,
however, we can separately assess two distinct problems for originalism
raised by Justice Scalia’s infidelity. The first is his willingness to
abandon the text where it is insufficiently rule-like to be properly
enforced by judges. The second is his willingness to abandon
originalism when it leads to untenable results.
Justice Scalia’s willingness to enforce only those portions of the text
that he finds sufficiently rule-like is based on his claim that judicial
review is warranted only when judges are doing lawyerly tasks like
interpreting rules. When something like a policy judgment is required,
that judgment is properly left to the legislature, as is the application of
more abstract constitutional requirements to the laws they enact. In
other words, we leave it to the legislatures to decide how and whether to
adhere to the more abstract provisions of the text. Judges must stick to
their rule-following knitting. But this position is based on a largely
unspecified and highly under-theorized view of constitutional legitimacy
in general and judicial review in particular.
A CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S FAINT-HEARTED ORIGINALISM
Let me now sketch an alternative that I have elaborated at greater
length elsewhere.36 As already noted, in my book Restoring the Lost
Constitution, I reject the idea of popular sovereignty or the “consent of
the governed” as any support for a constitution of a polity such as the
United States. While unanimous consent to governance is quite possible
and common—all of you who are students or faculty at the University of
Cincinnati have done so—it is a fiction to think that such unanimous
consent exists, or has ever existed, at the national level. While some
may consent, others surely do not, and mere acquiescence to prevailing
government does not constitute consent. I will not pursue this claim
here. Instead, I wish to describe the alternative route to constitutional
legitimacy I defend in my book.
The challenge is to establish legitimate governance of those who have
not consented. I contend that such governance is warranted, even in the

35. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 862.
36. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 32–52.
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absence of consent, (a) if the rights of those on whom it is imposed
coercively have not been violated and (b) if such coercion is needed to
protect the rights of others, which all have a duty to respect regardless of
whether they consent to do so. In other words, no one can complain
about a particular legal regime if their rights have not been violated; and
they are obligated to obey rules that are necessary to protect the rights of
others.
Put another way, nonconsensual legal regime is legitimate if it
follows procedures that assure the laws it imposes on a nonconsenting
public are both necessary to protect the rights of others and proper
insofar as they do not violate the rights of those on whom they are
imposed. By “legitimate,” I mean that the regime is capable of
producing laws that are entitled to a prima facie duty of obedience.
Laws made according to such procedures are entitled to a benefit of the
doubt.
At this juncture, I ask you to set aside your doubts about both my
critiques of popular sovereignty and the theory of legitimacy I offer as
an alternative to it. Be assured that I address objections to both stances
elsewhere. Assume for the sake of argument that there exists this
alternative nonconsensual route to legitimacy based on the respect for
individual rights.
If established, what implications would this
alternative basis for constitutional legitimacy have for constitutional
interpretation?
To begin, in the absence of consent, the legitimacy of a constitutional
regime should be assessed by how well it protects individual rights.
Does following a particular constitution when enacting laws make it
more likely than not that such laws do not violate rights and are
necessary to protect the rights of others? To answer this question
requires an assessment of both the substance and procedural features of
a particular constitutional order. Such an assessment would need to
decide whether a system that combines elements of federalism,
separation of powers, a bifurcated legislature, a presidential veto power
subject to a supermajoritarian override, judicial review, enumerated and
limited powers, and an explicit but limited bill of rights provides
confidence that lawful commands emerging from such a system are so
likely to respect rights that they merit the benefit of the doubt. I won’t
address this complex question here, but I hope you can see both the
nature of such an inquiry, and how it differs from worrying about
whether a particular constitutional regime was consented to by some or
all of those upon whom is it coercively imposed.
The second step in discerning the implications of this route to
legitimacy for constitutional interpretation is to note that a written
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constitution is one more structural feature of our constitutional order in
addition to those I just listed. Why put a constitution in writing? There
are at least two good reasons for doing so. First, because it helps “lock
in” all the other legitimacy-enhancing features of a constitution I have
already described. If you want to preserve a constitutional order that is
legitimate because it has certain procedural features that ensure the
protection of rights, then to prevent degeneration into an illegitimate
system, we want these procedures to be put in writing.
When the presidential veto power is put in writing, for example,
denying or disparaging that power becomes much harder. Students, ask
yourselves why you would want your professors to put their attendance
policy in writing, and you will begin to see why the “lock-in” function
of a written constitution is legitimacy enhancing. Second, a written
constitution was devised as a means to impose law on those who impose
laws on the governed. In other words, it was way to impose law on lawmakers, interpreters, and enforcers. Such a law is meant to restrict the
exercise of law-making to actions that respect the rights retained by the
people.
But a written constitution can perform neither the “lock-in” or rightsprotecting functions if those who are supposed to be bound and limited
by its terms may alter their meaning at their discretion—especially when
these changes systematically expand the powers of law-makers. What it
means to bind those who make, interpret and enforce the laws, is that
they may not rewrite the laws that bind them. For this reason, the
meaning of the Constitution must remain the same until it is properly
changed; and it is as improper for those upon whom the restraints of the
Constitution are imposed to alter its meaning—whether alone or in
combination with other branches—as it is for you or I to alter the laws
that bind us.
The principle that “the meaning of the Constitution shall remain the
same until it is properly changed,” is simply another way of describing
original meaning originalism. Because those who are to be governed by
the law of the Constitution may not change it in their own, the founders
provided alternate institutions—either state legislatures or state
conventions—who must concur in any changes. To summarize, for a
written constitution to perform its legitimacy-enhancing function, judges
cannot alter the meaning of the written Constitution they swear an oath
to uphold. That would be like taking an oath “to preserve protect and
defend what I think the Constitution ought to say.” That is hardly an
oath of fidelity at all. It is like crossing one’s fingers when making a
promise.
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This route to legitimacy in the absence of consent explains why
adherence to a written constitution contributes to legitimacy by limiting
the proper powers of those who impose laws on the nonconsenting
people and why the meaning of such a writing should remain the same
until properly changed. It also explains why all the limits on the powers
of government by which rights are protected should be enforceable, not
merely the ones that look like rules. Judicial review of legislation
provides an important means by which legislatures can be held to their
proper powers. If judges decline to enforce these limits, then all we
have is trust in the discretion of legislatures to stay within them. But if
we could trust legislatures to this degree to protect the rights retained by
the people, we would have no need for a written constitution, indeed for
any constitution.
I maintain that the enterprise of constitutionalism is based, in whole
or in part, on a basic distrust that government will stay within its proper
role of protecting and respecting the rights of the people. If this distrust
is unwarranted, then we can do without a written constitution altogether.
I think many who reject originalism would favor this option. On both
the political left and right you find the belief that majoritarian voting is
sufficient to protect the rights of the people. Or at least they believe this
when their side is in power. The founders personally experienced a
purely majoritarian system in their post-revolutionary states and rejected
it. Perhaps the founders were wrong. But I find it worth noting that
those who seem to desire an escape from some of the bonds of our
written Constitution do not openly advocate its abandonment or change.
Instead, they claim to be respecting it.
ORIGINALISM: THE BETTER APPROACH
Although alternatives to originalism are surprisingly hard to identify
with any specificity, there is one very popular method that can be called
the “underlying principles” approach. We discern from the text the
deeper underlying principles that underlie its particular injunctions. We
then appeal to these underlying principles to limit the scope of the text
or ignore it altogether. Those who employ this approach can claim that
they are still enforcing the Constitution, in the sense that they are
implementing the principles for which it stands. The principal appeal of
this approach is the possibility that it produces better results than can be
produced by the written text.
Allowing the underlying principles to substitute for or supercede the
text, however, has its drawbacks. For one thing, because the underlying
principles are not themselves in writing and are often far from
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incontestable, the principles may simply represent the preference of
whoever is doing the “interpreting.” Secondly, because the underlying
principles, even if correct, are usually very abstract, how they are to be
applied in particular cases can be very uncertain. Does the principle of
free expression supposedly underlying the right of freedom of speech
lead one to support or oppose restrictions on paid political
advertisements within 60 days of an election?
Although such
restrictions take the form of restricting speech, perhaps they enhance
freedom of expression by “leveling the playing field” and letting other
voices be heard.
If pretty much anyone can play this game to reach virtually any result,
then the Constitution is no longer the source of law for law-makers.
Instead, the real arbiters of government power are those in the courts
who discern the underlying principles. Everything then depends on who
the Justices are, rather than on what the Constitution says. Some root
for Ginsberg or Stevens, others for Kennedy, still others for Scalia. I
think the judicial nomination and confirmation process we now see
stems in part from a willingness to place the judges’ views of underlying
principles ahead of what the Constitution actually says to reach arguably
better results than can be reached by the text of the Constitution.
The appeal of the underlying principles approach is two-fold. First,
the approach is plausible because we often do need to consider the
principles underlying the text to make sense of it. Does the Second
Amendment protect the right to bear weapons, or the appendages to
which our hands are attached? Does its protections extend beyond
ordinary bearable weapons that are used in legitimate self-defense, to
side-winder missiles or nuclear weapons? These questions cannot be
asked without some appeal to what historical purpose the provision was
supposed to serve.
What is objectionable is when appeal to the underlying principles is
used to ignore or trump the text. If the principle underlying the Second
Amendment is defined as contributing to public safety or even personal
protection, some can then contend that with the emergence of
government police forces and more lethal weapons, this purpose is best
served by ignoring the right to keep and bear arms that is locked into the
text. In other words, where there is a will to do so, the technique can be
as easily and almost always used to obviate rather than interpret the
Constitution.
The second appeal of the underlying principles approach is that it
appears to yield better results than respecting the text and nothing but
the text. Its supporters point to particular cases we all accept today as
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sacred. Brown v. Board of Education37 is perhaps the most canonical of
cases in the canon. It is then claimed that, because the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot deliver the desired result, the
meaning of the text must be changed by judges to something that is
morally superior. I would guess that this argument motivates the
approach of ninety percent of constitutional law professors.
There are three responses to this contention. First, those who make
this argument often strain to show why originalism cannot produce the
same result because their real purpose is to refute originalism. Very
often a proper version of original meaning originalism offers support for
results that present doctrine has a difficult time justifying. As I explain
in Restoring the Lost Constitution, the original meanings of the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause offer far more
justifiable and robust protection of personal liberty, for example, than do
current approaches based on the Due Process clauses.38
Second, the underlying principles approach typically yield results that
appeal to majorities when they are decided, but look decidedly inferior
in hindsight. In this category, I would put Dred Scott v. Sandford,39
Plessy v. Ferguson,40 and Korematsu v. United States.41 In other words,
superior results are supposed to justify an abandonment of original
meaning in favor of appeals to underlying principles, but all that is truly
guaranteed are results that are popular with some segment of the
population when they are decided. There is simply no guarantee that
judges responding to popular sentiments will outperform the text of the
original Constitution as it has been formally amended.
Third, your political enemies can use the underlying principles
approach to gut the provisions of the Constitution you care about when
they get in power. When they do, the only objection you can make is to
their politics. You cannot rightly complain about their method, or that
they are violating the text of the written constitution, because they are
simply doing what you would do. If you do not like Justice Scalia’s
underlying principles, you can hardly complain that he is disregarding
the text of the Ninth Amendment, when you would ignore any text that
contradicted the underlying principles you support.
Given that we all care about the Constitution because we want a better
rather than a worse society, the question is which approach is preferable.
A system of nonoriginalist or faint-hearted originalist Justices enforcing
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See BARNETT, supra note 8.
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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the principles they find underlying the text of the Constitution and
ignoring the text itself when it stands in the way of results of which they
approve? Or a consistent respect for the original meaning of the written
Constitution as a whole?
Given what this Constitution says, I choose the Constitution, but I can
understand why those who disagree with what it says would prefer the
Justices. To them I can offer only two types of objections. The first is
to contest their claim that their system yields a better society than does
reliance on the original meaning of the written Constitution as a whole.
The second is to object that they are engaged in bait and switch. While
invoking “the Constitution” that is revered by the American people, they
are really replacing it with their own visions of the principles they see
underlying the text. If they were candid about what they were doing,
however, I doubt that this technique would be well received.
CONCLUSION
Does this defense of a fearless originalism by which the whole
Constitution is enforced—including the original meaning of abstract
clauses like the Ninth Amendment—lead to the sort of horrible results
that, in part, leads Justice Scalia to be faint of heart? I think not. In my
view, the original meaning of the entire Constitution, as amended, is far
more felicitous than he apparently believes it to be. But this is partly
because I do not think the original meaning of the more general clauses
is as limited he does. In other words, an appropriate use of original
meaning originalism leads to far fewer objectionable results than he
thinks it will.
In his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia anticipated and rejected this move.
One way to avoid objectionable results, he observed,
would be to say that it was originally intended that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause would have an evolving content—that “cruel and
unusual” originally meant “cruel and unusual for the age in question” and
not “cruel and unusual in 1791.” But to be faithful to originalist
philosophy, one must not only say this but demonstrate it to be so on the
basis of some textual or historical evidence. Perhaps the mere words
“cruel and unusual” suggest an evolutionary intent more than other
provisions of the Constitution, but that is far from clear; and I know of no
historical evidence for that meaning. And if the faint-hearted originalist
is willing simply to posit such an intent for the “cruel and unusual
punishment” clause, why not for the due process clause, the equal
protection clause, the privileges and immunity clause, etc.? When one
goes down that road, there is really no difference between the fainthearted originalist and the moderate nonoriginalist, except that the former
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finds it comforting to make up (out of whole cloth) an original
evolutionary intent, and the latter thinks that superfluous.42

But here I think Justice Scalia misunderstands what originalism
requires. Indeed, here he appears to be reverting to original intent
originalism when he asks whether “the mere words ‘cruel and unusual’
suggest an evolutionary intent.” In contrast, original public meaning
originalism attempts to identify the level of generality in which the
Constitution is objectively expressed. Does the text ban particular
punishments of which they were aware, or does it ban all cruel and
unusual punishments? Does the text protect only enumerated rights, or
does it also insist that other rights not be denied or disparage? Does the
Fourteenth Amendment protect a specific list of liberties debated at the
time from infringement by states, or did it protect all “privileges or
immunities of citizenship”? Did the Second Amendment protect only
such weapons as existed in 1789 or did it protect bearable “arms”?
This is not to say, however, that the broader provisions of the text
lack all historical meaning and are open to anything we may wish them
to mean. I do not know enough about the phrase “cruel and unusual” to
comment knowledgeably on it, but I do know that the rights retained by
the people was a reference to natural rights, which were conceived of as
liberty rights. That this was its public meaning at the time of its
enactment is demonstrable.43 Similarly, the “privileges or immunities”
in the Fourteenth Amendment was a reference both to natural liberty
rights and the extra procedural protections of individuals provided by
the Bill of Rights.44 Broad as both these provisions are, they are neither
unlimited nor entirely open-ended.
In sum, an originalist must take the whole text of the Constitution as it
was written, whether rule-like or not. That the founders and the authors
of the Fourteenth Amendment drafted texts that leave some discretion in
application to changing circumstances is not a bug. It’s a feature.
Applying the more abstract provisions of the text is required by a proper
approach to originalism. Justice Scalia fails to realize that original
meaning originalism, properly understood, avoids many of the abhorrent
results that caused him in his Taft Lecture to shrink from a fearless
adherence to originalism.
Of course, there is much more to be said about originalism than I have
said here, some of which I have discussed at length elsewhere. And I
and other originalists have more work to do, both theoretically and
42. Scalia, supra note 1, at 861–862.
43. See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2006).
44. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 60–66.
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investigating original meaning. But I hope I have shown first, that
Justice Scalia’s faint-hearted commitment to originalism is not really
originalism at all, either in theory or in practice. Second, that adherence
to original meaning originalism is warranted as an implication of a
written constitution, a structural feature of our constitutional order that
enhances its legitimacy. Third, that the most prevalent alternative to
originalism—an “underlying principles” approach—has its own serious
drawbacks. And finally that a fearless commitment to originalism might
avoid rather than reach the horrible results that causes even so fearless a
jurist of originalism to become faint of heart. Because Justice Scalia
places a higher priority on other considerations—such as
majoritarianism and judicial restraint—I doubt this defense of
originalism would change his mind. But perhaps it will embolden others
to venture where Justice Scalia fears to tread.

